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With more and more emphasis on water resource
planning and management at the state and local levels of
government, it is useful to explore the legal restraints that
exist on the exercise of this planning and management
function. The authors in this issue of Update explore
many of the basic restraints that are imposed from outside
the state with a particular focus on recent developments.
Because the focus is on restraints from outside the state,
the symposium does not deal with self-restraints such as
the state constitutional provisions found in many western
states that specify a regime for water resource
management. However, the public trust doctrine is dealt
with even though there is some question as to the source
of the doctrine. All of the outside restraints have some
relationship to the federal government. In a way all of
the restraints are tied to the U.S. Constitution, some more
directly than others.

tested on the basis not just of whether it involves an
article in commerce or a mode of commerce but also on
whether or not the activity or thing being regulated has a
substantial effect on interstate commerce. Thus in recent
times a federal court upheld federal regulation of the Rito
Seco Creek located entirely within Costilla County in
Colorado because two reservoirs collected all the water of
the Creek which was then used for recreation and to
irrigate crops that when harvested were sold in interstate
commerce. (United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc.)
However, also recently a different federal court showed
reluctance to allow federal regulation of small isolated
water bodies on the basis that ducks or other waterfowl
traveling interstate used the water as a stopping off point.
(Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. Administrator, U.S.E.P.A.) The
Court ultimately concluded with reference to one of those
bodies of water (labeled Area A and consisting of a bowl
shaped depression of about 1 acre in size which collected
water from time to time) that “the migratory birds are
better judges of what is suitable for their welfare than are
we .... Having avoided Area A the migratory birds have
thus spoken and submitted their own evidence. We see
no need to argue with them.” Area B was not an isolated
wetland but rather was located adjacent to an otherwise
navigable body of water so that Hoffman Homes did not
appeal the decision that regulatory power extended to that
body.

The first question to be asked is whether there is authority
to regulate the water resource in the first instance. At
least in theory states have the plenary police power while
the federal government is a government of only
enumerated powers.
Early federal legislation dealing with water resources was
justified on the basis that Congress through the
Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution had
power to regulate the navigable waters of the United
States as they were the situs of the most important
commerce in the nation. (United States v. Appalachian
Electric Power Co.) The commerce clause provides
simply and in its entirety:: “Congress shall have Power ...
To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among
the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.” (U.S.
Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 3) Over the years as the U.S.
Supreme Court’s view of the Commerce Clause evolved
and its scope thereby expanded, we came to the time
where it was no longer necessary for the Congressional
legislation dealing with the water resource to be limited
to navigable waters. (Kaiser Aetna v. United States)
While Congress was to continue using the phrase
navigable waters such as in the Clean Water Act, it is
clear that the validity of the federal legislation can be

Why is it of concern to states that the federal government
has power to deal with the water resource? The U.S.
Constitution provides that “This Constitution, and the
Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall
be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall
be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby....” (U.S. Const. art. VI, cl.
2). Professor Kelley explores the indirect restraint that
this provision, commonly known as the supremacy clause,
places on state power. However the fact that the federal
government has acted with respect to a particular water
resource does not mean that the state government has no
power to act. This lack of understanding of our federal
system was exhibited recently in the context of a water
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project being developed by a local community in Illinois.
Because the community had obtained permission from the
Corps of Engineers which has to approve any deposit of
dredge or fill material into a wetland and because the
Corps had also determined that the federal endangered
species act would not be violated by the project, the
community appears to have assumed that it did not have
to comply with the state endangered species act. This
assumption would, however, be erroneous because states
are permitted to have their own endangered species acts
which can both cover additional species not covered
under the federal act and be more stringent that the
federal act on covered species. What states cannot do is
act when the federal government has pre-empted the field
or when the state action would conflict head-on with what
the federal government expressly allows or expressly
forbids.

of it. Here solutions to disputes are handled through
original jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court, through
negotiation and approval of interstate compacts, and
through Acts of Congress. The Supreme Court has
developed the doctrine of “equitable apportionment”
under which it allocates interstate waters among the
relevant states. Once the Court has apportioned the water
the upper state is required to let water pass to the lower
state even though some private users in the upper state
who now will not get water may have earlier use rights
than users in the lower state. (Hinderlider v. La Plata
River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co.) Around forty
interstate compacts have been entered into that deal with
water allocation or water pollution control. (Grant, Water
Apportionment Compacts Between States; Beck, 1991)
Because states voluntarily enter into compacts, these
might be viewed as self-imposed restraints. Congress has
exercised its power to allocate interstate waters only twice
apart from approving interstate compacts. The first
instance of congressional allocation involved the
Colorado River and the second involved the Truckee and
Carson Rivers and Pyramid Lake. (Grant, Apportionment
by Congress)

But even though the federal government has not acted,
the commerce clause as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme
Court is a two-edged sword. As well as giving the federal
government power, it restrains state power. Professor
Grant explores the restraint that the “negative commerce
clause” imposes on state water resource management and
planning.

In addition to the above sources of power, the U.S.
Supreme Court has recognized two other constitutional
powers as important sources of power for the federal
government to regulate the water resource. The first is
the property clause. This clause gives Congress power
“to dispose of and make all needful Rules and
Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property
belonging to the United States.” (U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3,
cl. 2) With the United States government still owning
almost one-third of the land area of the United States this
is an important power. The U.S. Supreme Court has held
that the federal government has reserved water from the
public domain to satisfy the primary needs of discrete
land reservations whether Indian Reservations (Winters
v. United States) or National Forests (United States v.
New Mexico). The U.S. Supreme Court also has
recognized the taxing and spending power as a separate
source of power, particularly important for sustaining
some federal water projects. (United States v. Gerlach
Live Stock Co.) This clause provides that “Congress
shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes ... to pay the
Debts and provide for the ... general welfare of the United
States....” (U.S. Const. art. II, § 8, cl. 1)

In addition to the commerce clause, the U.S. Supreme
Court has also identified several other powers enumerated
in the Constitution that allow the federal government to
act regarding water resources. First, the Court said that
the treaty power gives the federal government authority
to enter into treaties that relate to water resources. (U.S.
Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2: “He [the President] shall have
Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate,
to make Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators
present concur”) This early case (Missouri v. Holland)
involved the treaty with England (on behalf of Canada) to
protect migratory waterfowl. The United States has
entered into treaties and other agreements with Canada
and Mexico concerning use and management of shared
water resources. As noted above, the supremacy clause in
the U.S. Constitution makes these treaties the supreme
law of the land and, therefore, to the extent that they
contain restraints on U.S. use and management of shared
water resources, the states, in turn, will be restrained in
planning for and managing those resources. However,
even without these treaties principles of international law
would apply to those water resources.

The second question to be asked is to what extent
Congress has exercised its power to restrain state action
with reference to the water resource. We could not begin
to explore in detail all of the laws enacted by Congress,

Somewhat akin to international law, states that share
water resources, whether lakes or streams, do not have
total control over the lake or stream in their state portion
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under the various powers noted above, that put some
restraint on the state’s power to engage in water resource
planning and management. However two authors do
explore two specific areas of water resource management
where Congress has exercised power that through the
supremacy clause becomes binding on the states.
Professor Royster explores the treatment by Congress of
Indian Tribal reservations as states for purposes of water
pollution control and Professor Davis explores federal
flood control and wetlands regulation in the first of two
related articles. Professor Davis’s exploration covers not
only where the water is being regulated as water but also
where it is being regulated as the habitat of an
endangered species.

and wetlands regulation and endangered species
protection. Finally, Professor Dunning explores the
public trust doctrine as it relates to the water resource.
Whatever the source of the public trust doctrine, it is clear
that in many states the doctrine restrains state action
regarding water resource management.

The third and final question to be asked is whether even
though there is authority to regulate, the state regulation
goes too far. Here the principal restraints are the due
process and takings clauses of the U.S. Constitution and
the public trust doctrine, but obviously other restraints
apply as well. Thus, for example, a public water utility
would not be able to discriminate in providing water
service on the basis of race as this would violate the equal
protection clause. Only the takings and public trust
doctrines are explored in this issue.
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The U.S. Constitution provides “No person shall ... be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.” (U.S. Const. amend. V)
While the courts have decided that this provision applies
only to the federal government, the same concepts are
applied to states through the fourteenth amendment
which provides: “nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”
(U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1). For the most part the due
process analysis in this context is a rather straightforward 3-question analysis. (Lawton v. Steele) Does the
exercise of power by the state relate to a legitimate police
power purpose (public health, safety, morals, or general
welfare)? If not, it violates due process. Does the
regulation that is imposed further the police power
purpose (as commonly stated, do the means further the
ends)? If not, it violates due process. Is the regulation
that is imposed unduly oppressive (a balancing of the
harm being corrected against the amount of restraint
imposed)? If so, it violates due process. Thus there are
three due process bases on which the state regulation
might flounder.
Professor Davis in the second of his two related articles
explores the takings clause in the context of floodplain
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